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Introduction 
 
The Ad hoc Advisory Committee on the Funding Strategy of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture observed in its seventh meeting in March 2013 (ITPGRFA, 2013a) 
that the flow of funds to Benefit Sharing Fund of the Treaty had stagnated  with no indications that the 
trend would reverse in the near future. It also observed that no benefits from the use of germplasm 
from the Multilateral System had accrued to the Benefit Sharing Fund, despite earlier expectations. The 
Committee, therefore, suggested that the Governing Body of the Treaty should explore innovative 
options to increase funds flowing into the Benefit Sharing Fund. The Committee noted that the “options 
should be based on the use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture and that the flow of 
funds should be predictable, immediate and reliable” (p.3). The Committee suggested a set of six 
options which should be explored further through option papers prepared by the Treaty Secretariat. 
The six options were (ITPGRFA, 2013b): 
1. Revisiting Article 6.11 of the Standard Material Transfer Agreement (SMTA). This could involve 
making the alternative payment option in SMTA Article 6.11 the preferred payment option.  
 
2. Revisiting Article 6.7 of the SMTA. This could involve making mandatory some payment 
obligations that are currently voluntary.  
 
3. Promoting regular seed-sales based contributions by Contracting Parties – Contracting Parties 
could be invited to make regular contributions to the Benefit Sharing Fund, similar to those 
pledged by Norway.  
 
4. Expanding the coverage of the Multilateral System through re-examination of the desirable 
composition of Annex-I to the Treaty.  
 
5. Novel ways to attract industry to volunteer funding.  
 
6. Upfront payments on access, to be discounted against payments due on commercialisation of a 
product. 
This report assesses the implications and revenue-generating potential of options 1, 2 and 4 above in 
the context of the structure of the global seed industry and the emerging landscape of plant variety 
innovation for different crops. The implementation of these options would require modification of 
Treaty/SMTA provisions to alter the nature of payment obligations related to different categories of 
products, the payment rates under different options and the coverage of crops in Annex-I to the Treaty.  
Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework for evaluating the options suggested by the Working Group is derived from 
an earlier study (Moeller and Stannard, 2013) on the potential benefit flows from the International 
Treaty and is presented in Figure-1. We do not discuss the conceptual framework in detail here but only 
note its key elements. The conceptual framework views the PGR available from the MLS primarily as a 
resource for plant variety innovation. The utilisation of this resource in innovation processes generates 
new products with commercial value. Institutional arrangements which include market structures and 
intellectual property regimes determine how the commercial value of innovations is appropriated by 
2 
 
different actors. SMTA-mediated PGR exchange under the Treaty is part of the institutional architecture 
that determines the appropriation of value and magnitude of flows into the BSF.  
Figure-1: Conceptual Framework for Assessment of Benefit-Sharing Flows from PGR 
Exchange 
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Development of Options 
Options 1 and 2 suggested by the Working Group (revisiting Articles 6.7 and 6.11 of the SMTA) could 
involve variations of different elements that determine payment obligations arising from the use of PGR 
accessed through SMTAs (hereinafter referred to as SMTA-PGR. The current architecture of payment 
obligations under SMTAs involves: 
(1) The alternative payment options offered to recipients of SMTA-PGR (here after called 
“Recipients”) – i.e., payment under Article 6.7 or Article 6.11 of the SMTA. 
(2) For each payment option: 
(a) The categories of product innovations to which payment obligations apply.  
(b) The nature of payment obligations – mandatory or voluntary- associated with each 
product innovation category.  
(c) The rates of payment applicable to different product innovation categories. 
(d) The duration for which payment obligations apply.  
 
Under the current provisions of the SMTA, a Recipient can opt for payments into the BSF under Article 
6.7 of the SMTA or alternatively opt for payment under Article 6.11 of the SMTA. Under Article 6.7 of 
the SMTA, a Recipient who commercialises a product innovation incorporating SMTA-PGR is required to 
make a mandatory payment of 0.77% (1.1% less 30%) of the sales of that product, if it is not available to 
others without restriction for further research and breeding. If the product is available to others without 
restriction for further research and breeding, then the Recipient is encouraged to a make a voluntary 
payment, without any precise rate being specified, under Article 6.8 of the SMTA. A Recipient who opts 
for payment under Article 6.11 of the SMTA is obliged to make a payment of 0.5% of all sales of 
seeds/planting material of the crop to which the SMTA-PGR relates, whether or not the product derives 
from SMTA-PGR. The payment obligation under Article 6.11 subsists for a period of 10 years after which 
the Recipient can decide to opt out of application of this Article.  
Mandatory versus Voluntary Payments: As noted above, mandatory payment obligations into the BSF 
arise only when innovations incorporating SMTA-PGR which are commercialised are not freely available 
to others without restrictions for further research and breeding. As explained below, an important 
implication of this provision is that mandatory payment obligations are confined to a very narrow range 
of innovations and may arise only in a limited number of countries. Although voluntary payments into 
the BSF are encouraged under Article 6.8 for innovations which are freely available to others for further 
research and breeding, both public and private sector users of SMTA-PGR have shown little inclination 
to make voluntary payments into the BSF. For enhancing revenue flows into the BSF an important 
option would be the conversion of voluntary payments into mandatory payments and/or the application 
of mandatory payments to a broader range of product innovation categories.  
Product Innovation Categories: The principle underlying the architecture of the BSF is that benefit-
sharing payments must arise when product innovations incorporating SMTA-PGR are commercialised. 
However, under Article 6.7, mandatory payment obligations arise only when the product innovation 
which is commercialised is not available without restriction to others for further research and breeding. 
The mandatory payment obligation under Article 6.7 has, therefore, been interpreted as being only 
applicable to product innovations that are protected by patents, because the “research exemption” or 
the permitted use of a patent-protected product for further research and development is extremely 
restricted.  
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However, most plant variety innovations in developed countries are protected not by patents, but by 
Plant Variety Protection (PVP), which is a sui generis form of intellectual property protection for plant 
variety innovations that takes into account the special characteristics of these innovations - their self-
reproducing nature and their sequential nature where each innovation is dependent on previous 
innovations. The criteria for protection in the case of PVP are “Distinctness, Uniformity and Stability”1 
and it generally allows for two exemptions that distinguish it from patents (1) the breeders’ exemption, 
which allows a breeder to use a protected variety in the development of follow on innovations2 and (2) 
farmers’ privilege/rights –which allows farmers to use farm-saved seed of protected varieties3 without 
payment of remuneration to the breeder. The availability of breeders’ exemption under PVP has been 
interpreted to mean product innovations protected by PVP are freely available without restriction to 
others for further research and breeding, and, therefore, do not attract mandatory payments under 
Article 6.7 if they incorporate SMTA-PGR. Only voluntary payments under Article 6.8 of the SMTA are 
encouraged for such innovations. A major implication is that the dominant proportion of plant variety 
innovations in developed countries that may incorporate SMTA-PGR are excluded from the purview of 
mandatory benefit-sharing arrangements under the International Treaty. It must also be noted that 
patents for plant varieties are available only in a limited number of countries4 (e.g., US, Australia, Japan, 
South Korea) and like all other forms of intellectual property rights, patents are national in scope. Thus, 
while a plant variety protected by patents in Australia and incorporating SMTA-PGR would be liable for 
mandatory payments, the same variety protected by PVP (or sold without protection) in another 
country would not attract mandatory payments. Moreover, following from the implementation of 
Article 27 (3) of the TRIPs Agreement, most developing countries are likely to adopt PVP or an 
appropriate sui generis system of protection for plant variety innovations rather than a system of 
patents. The current SMTA provisions exclude a dominant part of current and future plant variety 
innovations in both developed and developing countries from the purview of mandatory benefit-sharing 
arrangements. It should be noted that although PVP provides for breeders’ exemption, it is still an 
intellectual property right that provides monopoly rights to the innovator (for multiplication and 
                                                          
1
 As opposed to novelty, non-obviousness and potential for industrial application/commercial use in the case of 
patents.  
 
2
 Researchers’ exemption under PVP has been sought to be circumscribed through the introduction of the 
“Essential Derivation” clause in the 1991 revision of the UPOV Convention (UPOV, 1994). The essential derivation 
clause seeks to prevent other breeders from appropriating returns from a protected variety through minor 
(agronomically unimportant) modifications of the protected variety. Under the essential derivation clause, if a new 
plant variety innovation is shown to “essentially derived” from a protected variety, then the commercialisation of 
that new variety requires the consent of the breeder of the original variety. The essential derivation clause seeks 
to strengthen the IPR protection provided by PVP by preventing second round innovators from appropriating 
returns due to first round innovators through “cosmetic breeding” or relatively unimportant modifications of a 
protected variety.  
 
3
 Farmers’ privilege to replant seeds of protected varieties without payment of remuneration to the breeder has 
been restricted in the PVP legislation of many European countries and farmers are required to pay (a reduced) PVP 
royalty on the use of farm-saved seeds of protected varieties. In the European Union wide PVP legislation 
administered by the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO)(European Council, 1994), exemption from payment of 
royalties on farm-saved seed of protected varieties is available only for the category of “small farmers”. 
 
4
 The position regarding the patentability of plant varieties in the EU is complex. Although the European Patent 
Convention 1973 does not allow for plant varieties and essentially biological processes for the production of plants 
to be patented, the 1998 Directive of the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union on the legal 
protection of biotechnological inventions (European Council, 1998) allows the patenting of plants when the 
technical feasibility of the invention is not confined to a particular plant variety.  
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distribution of the variety), allowing the innovator to appropriate economic returns from the 
innovation. Therefore, extension of mandatory payment obligations to product innovations that are 
protected by PVP is an important option to be explored for enhancing revenue flows into the BSF, as it 
would bring a very large part of developed country innovations within the ambit of (mandatory) benefit-
sharing arrangements.  
National Agricultural Research Systems (NARS) in developing countries and the CGIAR centres that 
undertake breeding work for developing country environments are the largest users of SMTA-PGR (FAO, 
2010). A very large proportion of innovations utilising materials accessed from the MLS has been 
derived from the research activities of NARS in developing countries, often in collaboration with 
International Agricultural Research Centres (IARCs) of the CGIAR. Starting from the “Green Revolution” 
varieties in wheat and rice in South Asia, NARS in developing countries have produced a steady stream 
of plant variety innovations that have transformed the production and productivity of a range of crops 
in developing country agriculture with very large welfare effects5. However, the innovations developed 
by NARS in developing countries have been disseminated freely for commercial multiplication and 
distribution by public and private sector agencies and have not been subject to any form of intellectual 
property rights. As these innovations have remained freely available for further research and breeding, 
they do not attract mandatory payment obligations if they incorporate SMTA-PGR. There have been no 
voluntary payments into the BSF under Article 6.8 of the SMTA for innovations developed by NARS in 
developing countries. This is presumably because NARS are mandated to provide widespread 
dissemination of their innovations and do not seek an economic return from their innovations. 
Moreover, many of the PGR accessed from the MLS for the development of these innovations may have 
been originally contributed to the MLS by developing countries themselves.   
It should also be noted that in most developing countries, new varieties developed by NARS are subject 
to evaluation (for “value in cultivation and use”) through national trials before being released to farmers 
through variety release procedures. The varieties released to farmers through these variety release 
procedures6 are generally brought within the ambit of seed quality control regulations, as seed sales of 
these varieties are expected to be commercially significant. Once the new varieties are brought under 
the purview of quality control regulations, the production and distribution of seeds of these varieties 
may be subject to a number of restrictions designed to ensure that only quality seeds of these varieties 
are sold to farmers. For instance, it may be prescribed that only certified seed of these new varieties 
(produced in accordance with prescribed seed production norms/regulations7) may be sold. Bringing 
varieties developed by NARS under the purview of the quality control system is what enables public and 
private sector seed producers to develop and sustain a commercial market for seeds of these varieties 
                                                          
5
 There is a large literature documenting the contribution of collaboration between the CGIAR centres and NARS to 
the development of plant variety innovations that have transformed agricultural productivity in developing 
countries. For instance, see Evenson and Gollin (2002) and Brennan and Malayabas (2011). 
 
6
 Variety release procedures differ across countries. They are generally intended to be in the nature of credible 
and authentic recommendations to farmers for the adoption of new varieties developed by NARS or other 
agencies in specific agro-ecological zones. To ensure that the farmers receive the most appropriate 
recommendations for adoption of varieties, new varieties are generally subjected to trials or testing over several 
crop seasons for “value in cultivation and use”. Only new varieties which perform well in the trials in respect of 
different agronomic characteristics and yield are recommended for adoption to farmers or “released” to farmers. 
The release of the variety sets in motion the process of seed multiplication and dissemination to farmers through 
public or private sector seed companies or other agencies.  
7
 This may require access to the “breeder seeds” of the variety produced by NARS.  
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and obtain an economic return from their multiplication and distribution. When we examine the 
innovations generated through the use of PGR sourced from the MLS, we can distinguish a large and 
significant category of “regulated” products, which although not (yet) subject to any form of intellectual 
property protection, are subject to regulations that govern seed production and marketing. The 
extension of some form mandatory payment obligation to this category of regulated products is a 
potential option for enhancing revenue flows into the BSF.  
The above character of plant variety innovations of developing country NARS may undergo significant 
change in the future. As a consequence of Article 27(3) of the TRIPs Agreement, many developing 
countries have introduced or are in the process of introducing some form of PVP legislation (Tripp, 
Louwaars and Eaton, 2007). In developing countries where PVP systems have been introduced (e.g., 
India, Brazil), NARS appear to have been quite active in seeking protection for their innovations. In 
countries where the PVP legislation permits, NARS have also sought retrospective protection for their 
innovations developed before the entry into force of the PVP legislation. If this trend continues, a large 
part of the innovations of NARS in developing countries will become subject to PVP over time. 
Payment rates associated with different options/product categories: The payment rates prescribed 
under Article 6.7 (0.77% of sales of product innovation incorporating SMTA-PGR) and Article 6.11 (0.5% 
of sales of all seeds of crops for which SMTA-PGR has been accessed) do not appear to have been 
informed by an analysis of the incentives they provide Recipients for choice of the payment option. At 
the current rates of payment prescribed under Article 6.7 and Article 6.11, it would economically 
advantageous for a Recipient to choose Article 6.11 only if SMTA-PGR derived products constitute more 
than 65%8 of the sales of seeds of a particular crop. For most plant breeding/seed firms of any size, this 
threshold of 65% would not be reached in the foreseeable future or may never be reached at all. It 
should also be noted that payment obligations under Article 6.7 commence only after an SMTA-PGR 
product is commercialised (which may happen only several years after SMTA-PGR has been accessed), 
whereas payment obligations under Article 6.11 commence immediately after SMTA-PGR has been 
accessed. From the perspective of the BSF, the current structure of payment rates appears to dissuade 
Recipients from opting for Article 6.11, which can generate earlier flows into the fund. Alteration of 
payment rates under Article 6.7 and Article 6.11 to incentivise the adoption of Article 6.11 by Recipients 
would be important option for enhancing the near term flow of funds into the BSF. 
The current structure of payment rates involves a common rate applicable to (1) all product categories 
that attract mandatory payments under Article 6.7 and (2) all product categories that attract payment 
obligations under Article 6.11. However, it is well established in the intellectual property rights 
literature (see for instance Maskus, 2005), that the returns appropriated from an innovation by an 
innovator depend on the strength of intellectual property protection. A new plant variety protected by 
patents (which hence does not allow for breeders’ exemption or farmers’ rights) is likely to yield a 
higher economic return to an innovator than a variety that is protected by PVP (a relatively weaker form 
of protection) or a variety which falls in the “regulated” category of products which may not be 
protected by any form of intellectual property rights at all. If benefit-sharing obligations are to be 
related to the returns appropriated by innovators, then there would be a strong economic rationale for 
applying different payment rates to different product categories of product innovations based on their 
                                                          
8
 The Article 6.11 option would be chosen by an SMTA Recipient only if: 
Payment obligations under Article 6.11 < Payment obligations under Article 6.7  
=>  0.005 x Commercial seed sales of SMTA-PGR crop < 0.0077 x Commercial seed sales of SMTA-PGR 
crop x Share of SMTA-PGR derived varieties in seed sales of that crop 
=>  Share of SMTA-PGR derived varieties > 0.6493 (or approximately 65%) 
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intellectual property protection status – with the highest rate being applied to patent protected 
products, a lower rate for PVP protected products and a still lower rate applied to “regulated” products.  
Choice of payment options: As discussed above, from the perspective of enhancing (near term) flow of 
funds into the BSF, it may be advantageous to incentivise Recipients to opt for payments under Article 
6.11. The most certain way of achieving this would be the elimination of the Article 6.7 option under the 
SMTA, leaving only the option under Article 6.11. The withdrawal of the Article 6.7 option (with suitable 
modifications to Article 6.11) could, therefore, be considered as an one way of enhancing revenue flows 
into the BSF. Less certain ways of creating this incentive would be to balance the relative payment levels 
for patents and for PVP in such a way that patents payment rates are substantially higher. 
Static and Dynamic Analysis 
Plant variety innovation is a dynamic and sequential process often involving long lead times between 
PGR access and the emergence of innovations that can be commercially exploited. Payment obligations 
to the BSF – voluntary or mandatory (under Article 6.7 and 6.8 of the SMTA) – are linked to the 
commercial exploitation of innovations developed using SMTA-PGR.  This implies that payment flows 
into the BSF may arise with a considerable time lag after PGR has been accessed through an SMTA. 
Depending on the length of the breeding cycle and type of material accessed, the lag between PGR 
access and payment flows could be 10-15 years or more. The evaluation of the options suggested by the 
Working Group, therefore, need to be carried out from two perspectives  (1) a static perspective, which 
examines the potential flows from the options given the current structure of the seed industry in 
developed and developing countries and the current status of innovation in different crops (which 
reflect past access and use of PGR from the MLS or its predecessor institutions) and (2) a dynamic 
perspective, which examines the potential flows from the options, reflecting the projected future use of 
SMTA-PGR and the generation of plant variety innovations over an extended period of time. This study 
presents the evaluation of options from a static perspective. The evaluation of options from a dynamic 
perspective is presented in a separate report. 
 
Static Analysis 
Options for Static Analysis 
Based on the above discussion of possible variations in elements that constitute the current 
architecture of payment obligations under the SMTA, we have developed the following options for the 
static analysis of revenue-enhancing options.  
Option 1 - Baseline or Status Quo Option: This option provides the benchmark for comparison with all 
other options. It assesses the potential flow of funds into the BSF retaining the current structure of 
payment obligations under the SMTA, the current payment rates under Article 6.7 and Article 6.11 and 
the nature of payment obligations (mandatory or voluntary) associated with different product 
categories.  
Option 2 – Revisiting Article 6.7 of the SMTA - This option envisages extension of mandatory payments 
to product categories incorporating SMTA-PGR that currently do not attract mandatory payment 
obligations. We consider two scenarios under this option: 
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Scenario 1: This scenario envisages extension of mandatory payments to PVP products that 
incorporate SMTA-PGR. 
Scenario 2:  This scenario envisages extension of mandatory payments to PVP and regulated 
products that incorporate SMTA-PGR.  
Under both these scenarios, we allow for varying rates of payments to be applied to different product 
categories – with patented products attracting a higher rate of payment than PVP products and PVP 
products attracting a higher rate of payment than regulated products (where applicable). 
Option 3- Revisiting Article 6.11 of the SMTA:  This option will assess the potential revenue flows into 
the BSF if Article 6.11 were to be made the sole payment option (i.e., with Articles 6.7/6.8 being 
withdrawn) with a narrowing of product categories that attract Article 6.11 payments and with lower 
payment rates applicable to different product categories. Again we provide for patented products 
attracting a higher rate of payment than PVP products and PVP products attracting a higher rate of 
payment than regulated products (where applicable). The assessment of potential revenue flows under 
this option is made on the assumption of universal use of SMTA-PGR by all players in the seed industry 
Option 4 - Expansion of Crop Coverage under Annex-I: Separately, we will examine the impact of 
expanding the coverage of Annex-I to include all crops. We will examine the potential effects on 
revenue flows into the BSF of inclusion of certain major crops like soybean, vegetable crops like 
tomatoes and onions and industrial crops like cotton.  
Data and Methodology 
An assessment of the potential flow of revenue into the BSF in the above scenarios involves the 
following steps: 
(1) Identification of commercialised product innovations incorporating SMTA-PGR in national seed 
markets for crops covered in Annex-I of the International Treaty.  
(2) Identification of the intellectual property rights to which the commercialised product 
innovations are subject in different national jurisdictions.  
(3) Assessment of the commercial sales of product innovations incorporating SMTA-PGR in 
different national markets to derive the payment obligations under the SMTAs.  
The assessment of potential revenue flows into the BSF, therefore, requires reliable data on national 
commercial seed markets, the share of products that incorporate SMTA-PGR and the intellectual 
property rights to which they are subject in different jurisdictions. Box-1 discusses the data sources and 
constraints related to the analysis of national seed markets. A major constraint is the general non-
availability of variety-level information for commercial seed markets which is critical for the evaluation 
of the options. 
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Box-1: Data Sources and Constraints for Analysis of National Seed Markets 
An accurate assessment of the value of the global commercial seed market is a difficult exercise because of the absence of reliable and 
consistent data sources across countries. In almost all countries, the extensive use of farm-saved seed for different crops implies that 
commercial seed use is a fraction of the total seed use. The proportion of commercial seed use to total seed use is reflected in the “Seed 
Replacement Rates” (SRRs) which vary widely across crop, type of variety (hybrid versus non-hybrids), countries and over time. Thus, even 
where reliable estimates of seed use are available from crop production data, the estimation of the volumes of commercial seed requires 
information on seed replacement patterns adopted by farmers. Derivation of the value of commercial seed sold from volume data further 
requires information on seed prices which are also subject to wide variation across individual varieties and countries.  
 
Commercial seed is sold in seed markets by public and private sector companies of varying sizes – ranging from small independent seed 
companies producing and marketing seed locally to giant global companies that market seeds across continents. While published reports 
and accounts may provide some information on the seed sales of these companies, there is no organised statistical system for collection 
and consolidation of seed sales data at the provincial or national level in most countries. The information from published reports of seed 
companies may not provide information on the value of seed sales by crop. Variety level information (which is critical for assessment of 
payment obligations under SMTAs) is invariably never provided as companies regard variety level data to be commercially sensitive. For 
large global companies operating in several countries (often through a web of affiliated, “group” or subsidiary companies) and covering 
several different types of agricultural inputs, the assessment of the value of commercial seed sales by crop from published reports may be 
infeasible or very complex. Seed industry association at the national or international level do often compile seed sales of members – but 
again data coverage of crops and industry segments varies considerably and data may not be made available publicly at a disaggregated 
level. Variety information is again not available. In seed markets characterised by intense competition for market share, industry players 
have few incentives to disclose variety level information.  
 
Commercial seed is sold in national jurisdictions subject to marketing and quality control regulations. It is data generated in the 
enforcement of these regulations that provide the most reliable data on commercial seed use at the crop (and at times, variety) level. In 
countries with variety registration systems, commercial seed can be sold only if a variety has been registered or inscripted in a national 
register. In the EU, varieties of agricultural plant species and vegetable seed can be marketed only if they are inscripted in the EU common 
catalogue of varieties, which is updated every year. Many countries also have variety release procedures or a list of recommended 
varieties (which are in the nature of recommendations to farmers for adoption). Variety registration systems and recommended variety 
lists are, therefore, an authentic source of information on the varieties that can be commercialised in different jurisdictions. Most 
countries also operate seed certification systems for quality control that may be mandatory or optional. In most EU countries, seed 
certification is compulsory, which implies that all commercial seed sales must be subject to seed certification. In countries, where seed 
certification is compulsory, seed certification statistics provide authentic data on variety-wise1 volumes of commercial seed produced. 
However, in other countries (e.g., the USA and many developing countries), seed certification may be optional or may apply only to a set 
of varieties (e.g., released varieties) brought under the purview of quality control regulations. In such cases, seed certification statistics 
may provide only a partial view of the commercial seed market, although leading varieties may be covered. The OECD operates a 
certification scheme1 for seeds of selected cereal, forage and vegetable crops moving in international trade. Nearly, 58 countries 
(including some non-OECD countries) participate in these schemes. The list of varieties eligible for certification under the OECD schemes is 
a useful source of information on varieties moving in international trade for the crops covered. Although, the OECD collects information 
on the volume of certified seeds traded under the scheme, variety level information is not published.  
International seed trade statistics are another potential source of information on the size of the global commercial seed market, although, 
by definition, trade statistics exclude commercial seed produced and sold in domestic markets. The availability of data on seed trade at 
the crop level for different countries depends on the level of detail in the classification of goods adopted for generating international 
trade data. Trade statistics are recommended to be compiled under the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) of 
tariff nomenclature - an internationally standardised system of names and numbers for classifying traded products developed and 
maintained by the World Customs Organization (WCO) an independent intergovernmental organization with over 170 member countries 
based in Belgium. The HS system at the six digit level does not distinguish between seed and grain for most crops (i.e., the trade in seed is 
clubbed with trade in grain). However, some countries (e.g., EU, USA, China and India) have extended the classification to 9 or 10 digits 
(i.e., incorporated additional sub-categories) which allows “seeds for planting” to be distinguished as a separate category. Therefore, the 
availability of data on imports and exports of seeds at the crop level is available only for some countries that have gone beyond the 
mandatory six-digit classification of traded goods. Trade statistics on seeds even when they are available do not, however, provide any 
variety level information. Estimation of commercial seed volumes/value from international trade statistics is also confounded by the 
problem of import and re-export of seeds which is significant phenomenon for seeds of several crops (e.g., forage crops). 
Data on the global commercial seed market is also available from a number of commercial market research reports and seed market 
databases. These reports and data bases are mainly intended to assess market opportunities and competition in different markets and 
vary greatly in their scope and coverage of crops, countries and companies (often focusing on the largest players in the market). 
(Reproduced from Moeller and Stannard, 2013, p 72-74). 
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Given the data constraints for commercial seed markets discussed in Box-1, this study constructs a 
simulation model for estimating revenue flows into the BSF under the different scenarios using 
FAOSTAT data (FAOSTAT, 2013) which is possibly the largest and most comprehensive database of 
country and global level agricultural statistics available. The modelling approach estimates the size of 
the commercial seed market for each crop in Annex-I of the International Treaty in each country and 
then attempts to assess the share of product innovations that incorporate SMTA-PGR. Starting with 
FAOSTAT data on area harvested, crop production, seed use and producer prices, the simulation model 
relies on a number of key parameters (e.g., seed replacement rates, factors relating seed prices to 
commodity prices, patterns of intellectual property rights of plant variety innovations etc – all of which 
are explained in detail below) whose initial values are derived from the literature and earlier studies 
assessing potential payment flows into the BSF. These parameters are applied to the FAOSTAT data on 
crop production and seed use to derive the commercial values of products incorporating SMTA-PGR that 
may give rise to mandatory or voluntary payments under the SMTA. The model allows the simulation of 
revenue flows into the BSF for the different scenarios with varying values of these parameters. The 
spreadsheet version of the model has been constructed in such a way that as more accurate and 
reliable information on the parameters becomes available, the estimates of inflows into the BSF can be 
updated. The model and the steps underlying the simulation exercise are described below. The overall 
schema of the model is presented in Figure-2. 
  
11 
 
Figure-2: Schema of Simulation Model for Estimating Potential Inflows in BSF 
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(1) In the first step, the 64 crops covered in Annex-I of the International Treaty were mapped to 
FAOSTAT crop categories for which data on crop production were available (Table-1). It may be 
seen from Table-1 that for a number of crop categories in Annex-I there is no data available in 
FAOSTAT. An important crop category for which no information is available in FAOSTAT is 
forages. It should be noted that the forages included in Annex-I of the International Treaty are 
mainly temperate forages, while tropical forages are excluded. MLS collections of PGR of 
temperate forages are relatively small in relation to those of cereal crops9. That is, the MLS may 
not be a very important source of PGR for temperate forages. For certain other categories of 
crops, although data on production quantity and values are available, there is no data on 
seed/planting material use. Some key categories for which seed/planting material data are 
lacking are: 
 
a.  Horticultural Crops: Fruit crops like apples, strawberries and bananas are vegetatively 
propagated. Some horticultural crops are perennial crops (e.g., apples), which implies 
that growers may need to procure planting material only periodically. Although there is 
a significant commercial market in the planting material of horticultural crops, there 
appears to be no data available on the size or value of these markets.  
 
b. Vegetable Crops: The value of the global commercial vegetable seed/planting material 
market has been estimated at US $ 6 billion in 2012 (MarketsandMarkets, 2013) with 
nearly US $1.2 billion being accounted for by Annex-I crops. However, data on seed use 
for vegetable crops is not available from FAOSTAT. Seed use for these crops was 
estimated from the area cultivated in each country (for which data were available from 
FAOSTAT) and average seed use rates per hectare obtained from the literature. 
 
c. Root and tuber crops: Most root and tuber crops are propagated through the use of 
farm-saved seed tubers or through stem-cuttings (e.g., cassava) and there appears to be 
no significant commercial seed/seed tuber market for root and tuber crops with the 
significant exception of potatoes and sweet potatoes.  
In view of these data constraints, forages and horticultural crops included in Annex-I have been 
excluded from the analysis. In the case of root and tuber crops, it has been assumed that there 
is no commercial seed/planting material market for cassava, yams and taro10. It should be noted 
that our assessment of potential revenue flows into the BSF excludes payments that may arise 
from the use of SMTA-PGR of these crops.  
  
                                                          
9
 Forages constitute around 7% of the global ex-situ accessions of all crops (FAO, 2010). 
 
10
 While there appears to be no well defined commercial market for the propagating material of these crops, 
programme interventions in developing countries have focused on the supply of disease free planting material of 
these crops to farmers.  
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Table-1: Annex-I crops mapped to FAOSTAT crop categories 
Annex-I Crop Category FAOSTAT Crop Category 
 Crop Genus Classfication Subclass   
Oat Avena Food Cereal Oats 
Barley Hordeum Food Cereal Barley 
Rice Oryza Food Cereal Rice 
Rye Secale Food Cereal Rye 
Triticale Triticosecale Food Cereal Triticale 
Wheat Triticum et al. Food Cereal Wheat 
Maize Zea Food Cereal Maize 
Finger Millet Eleusine Food Millets 
Millets Pearl Millet Pennisetum Food Millets 
Sorghum Sorghum Food Millets Sorghum 
Beans Phaseolus Food Pulses and Beans 
Beans Faba Bean / Vetch Vicia Food Pulses and Beans 
Pigeon Pea Cajanus Food Pulses and Beans Pigeon Pea 
Chickpea Cicer Food Pulses and Beans Chickpea 
Grass pea Lathyrus Food Pulses and Beans 
Peas Pea Pisum Food Pulses and Beans 
Cowpea et al. Vigna Food Pulses and Beans Cowpea 
Lentil Lens Food Pulses and Beans Lentils 
Sunflower Helianthus Food Oilseed Sunflower 
Brassica complex   Food  Oilseed Rapeseed & Mustard 
Major aroids Colocasia, Xanthosoma Food Roots and Tubers   
Yams Dioscorea Food Roots and Tubers Yams 
Sweet Potato Ipomoea Food Roots and Tubers Sweet Potatoes 
Cassava Manihot Food Roots and Tubers Cassava 
Potato Solanum Food Roots and Tubers Potatoes 
Asparagus Asparagus Food Vegetable Asparagus 
Beet Beta Food Vegetable Sugarbeet 
Carrot Daucus Food Vegetable Carrots and Turnips 
Eggplant Solanum Food Vegetable Eggplant 
Brassica complex Brassica et al. Food Vegetable  Cabbages and other Brassicas 
Breadfruit Artocarpus Food Fruit/Food No FAOSTAT data 
Citrus Citrus Food Fruit All Citrus Fruits 
Coconut Cocos Food Fruit Coconuts 
Strawberry Fragaria Food Fruit Strawberry 
Apple Malus Food Fruit Apples 
Banana / Plantain Musa Food Fruit Bananas ;Plantains 
 Andropogon gayanus Forages Grass  
 
 
 
No FAOSTAT data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agropyron cristatum, desertorum Forages Grass 
Agrostis stolonifera, tenuis Forages Grass 
Alopecurus pratensis Forages Grass 
Arrhenatherum elatius Forages Grass 
Dactylis glomerata Forages Grass 
Festuca 
arundinacea, gigantea, 
heterophylla, ovina, 
pratensis, rubra Forages Grass 
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Annex-I Crop Category FAOSTAT Crop Category 
 Crop Genus Classfication Subclass   
Lolium 
hybridum, multiflorum, 
perenne, rigidum, 
temulentum Forages Grass 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No FAOSTAT data 
Phalaris aquatica, arundinacea Forages Grass 
Phleum pratense Forages Grass 
Poa alpina, annua, pratensis Forages Grass 
Tripsacum laxum Forages Grass 
Astragalus chinensis, cicer, arenarius Forages Legume 
Canavalia ensiformis Forages Legume 
Coronilla varia Forages Legume 
Hedysarum coronarium Forages Legume 
Lathyrus 
cicera, ciliolatus, hirsutus, 
ochrus, odoratus, sativus Forages Legume 
Lespedeza cuneata, striata, stipulacea Forages Legume 
Lotus 
corniculatus, subbiflorus, 
uliginosus Forages Legume 
Lupinus albus, angustifolius, luteus Forages Legume 
Medicago 
arborea, falcata, sativa, 
scutellata, rigidula, 
truncatula Forages Legume 
Melilotus albus, officinalis Forages Legume 
Onobrychis viciifolia Forages Legume 
Ornithopus sativus Forages Legume 
Prosopis 
affinis, alba, chilensis, 
nigra, pallida Forages Legume 
Pueraria phaseoloides Forages Legume 
Trifolium 
alexandrinum, alpestre, 
ambiguum, angustifolium, 
arvense, agrocicerum, 
hybridum, incarnatum, 
pratense, repens, 
resupinatum, 
rueppellianum, 
semipilosum, 
subterraneum, vesiculosum Forages Legume 
Atriplex halimus, nummularia Forages Other 
Salsola vermiculata Forages Other 
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(2) For each Annex-I crop included in the analysis, data were extracted from FAOSTAT on area 
harvested, crop production, yield and seed use for the top 3011 producing countries of each 
crop12. These top 30 countries were classified as developed and developing countries based on 
the World Bank classification13. The entire analysis was carried out using FAOSTAT figures for 
2011 as this was the most recent year for which country level data for most Annex-I crops were 
fully available.  
 
(3) For each crop and country, the seed use data in FAOSTAT reflects the total seed used (or set 
apart for planting) for a crop including farm-saved seed. In developing countries, farm-saved 
seed accounts for the dominant portion of total seed use. The size of the commercial seed 
market in each crop and country was derived using the Seed Replacement Rate (SRR) 
parameter. The SRR is a parameter well understood in the seeds sector and represents the 
proportion of seed use derived from commercial purchases of seed – it is the proportion of seed 
that is “renewed” or “replaced” through bought-in seed. SRRs vary over a wide range across 
crops and countries, with SRRs being significantly higher in developed countries in relation to 
developing countries.  
 
For the purposes of the simulation, the commercial seed market for each crop and country was 
further broken up into the following categories.  
(i) Commercial seed market for patented varieties. 
(ii) Commercial seed market for PVP varieties. 
(iii) Commercial seed market for regulated varieties.  
The break up into these three categories was required because the payment options being 
evaluated could involve different payment rates for each of these categories. The value of the 
commercial seed market in the three categories was derived through the following steps. 
(a) We first derived the total seed use for patented and non-patented varieties for each in the 
top 30 producers. To derive the share of patented varieties in the total seed use the 
following assumptions  were made: 
i. Only genetically modified varieties (varieties developed through the application of agricultural 
biotechnology) are likely to be protected by patents. 
                                                          
11
 The rationale for including only the top 30 producers of each crop in the analysis was that no significant 
payments into the BSF could be expected from entities in contracting parties that were only minor producers of a 
crop.  
 
12
 In identifying the top 30 producers of any crop, we considered all countries covered in FAOSTAT including those 
which are not currently members of the International Treaty. The rationale for this was that the SMTA-users in 
non-contracting parties are also bound by payment obligations to the BSF. For instance a seed company in the US 
(a non-contracting party) that accesses MLS material under an SMTA would be bound by payment obligations.  
 
13
 The World Bank (2014) classifies  countries into lower, middle and higher income countries based on GDP per 
capita. Lower and middle income countries are classified as “developing” while higher income countries are 
classified as “developed” in this study.  
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ii. Patents for plant varieties developed through the application of biotechnology will continue 
to be available only in a limited number of countries (US, Australia, Japan, S. Korea). 
iii. The proportion of patented seed use to total seed use for a crop can be estimated from the 
proportion of area sown to genetically modified varieties for that crop.  
Therefore, where i indexes crops and j indexes countries, 
(Seed use for patented varieties)ij =(Total seed use)ij  x  (Area under GM varieties)ij 
                                                                                                           (Total area under cultivation)ij 
and 
(Seed use for non-patented varieties)ij =(Total seed use)ij  x  (Area under non-GM varieties)ij 
                                                                                                                  (Total area under cultivation)ij 
 
While the figures for total seed use and total area under cultivation were derived from FAOSTAT, 
area under genetically modified varieties was estimated from the data available from the 
publications of the International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications (ISAAA) 
(James, 2012). 
(b) We then derived the commercial seed use for patented and non-patented varieties using 
the SRRs for these categories: 
 
(Commercial seed use for patented varieties)ij =(Seed use for patented varieties)ij x (SRR-
patents)ij 
where (SRR-patents)ij = Seed Replacement Rate for patented varieties in crop i in country j.  
and 
(Commercial seed use for non-patented varieties)ij = (Seed use for non- patented varieties)ij x 
(SRR-non-patents)ij 
where (SRR-non-patents)ij = Seed Replacement Rate for non-patented varieties in crop i in 
country j. 
The commercial seed use for non-patented varieties was further divided into commercial seed 
use for PVP varieties and commercial seed use for regulated varieties using the share of PVP and 
regulated varieties in non-patented seed use: 
(Commercial seed use for PVP varieties)ij = (Commercial seed use for non-patented varieties)ij x 
(PVP share)ij   
where (PVP share)ij = Share of PVP protected varieties in non-patented seed use in crop i in 
country j. 
and 
(Commercial seed use for regulated varieties)ij = (Commercial seed use for non-patented 
varieties)ij x (Regulated share)ij   
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where (Regulated share)ij = Share of Regulated varieties in non-patented seed use in crop i in 
country j. 
(c) In the next step we derived the value of the commercial seed use (market) of patented, PVP 
and regulated varieties. The derivation of the value of the commercial seed market in these 
categories would require the market prices of seeds in each of these categories in different 
national markets. However, in the absence of information on seed prices in different 
markets, we estimated the value of the commercial market in these categories using a Seed 
Price Factor (SPF) parameter. The SPF is a parameter that relates seed prices for a crop to 
the level of producer prices for the commodity. For instance, if the producer prices for 
wheat in a country US $ 200 per tonne while the average price of wheat seeds is US $ 400 
per tonne, then the value of the SPF would be 2 The SPF expresses seed prices for a crop as 
multiple of the prevailing producer prices for the crop. Protected varieties can be expected 
to command a higher SPF than non-protected varieties and patented varieties can be 
expected to have a higher level of SPF than PVP protected varieties. Producer prices for 
agricultural commodities are available from FAOSTAT, while the SPF was used as a 
parameter which could be varied in the simulations, with plausible values derived from the 
analysis of seed prices for a limited number of countries/crops for which data were 
available.  
 
Therefore,  
(Value of commercial seed market of patented varieties)ij = (Commercial seed use of 
patented varieties)ij  x (Producer prices)ij x (SPF-patents)ij 
where   (SPF-patents)ij = Seed Price Factor for patented varieties in crop i in country j.    
 
(Value of commercial seed market of PVP varieties)ij = (Commercial seed use of PVP 
varieties)ij  x (Producer prices)ij x (SPF-PVP)ij 
where   (SPF-PVP)ij = Seed Price Factor  for PVP protected varieties for crop i in country j. 
   
(Value of commercial seed market of regulated varieties)ij = (Commercial seed use of 
regulated varieties)ij  x (Producer prices)ij x (SPF-Regulated)ij 
where   (SPF-Regulated)ij = Seed Price Factor for regulated varieties crop i in country j. 
 
(d) We then derived the value of the commercial patented seed, PVP seed and regulated seed 
that would attract payment obligations (mandatory or voluntary) to the BSF. This would 
require reliable data on the value share of varieties incorporating SMTA-PGR in each of 
these categories. Given the lack of data at the variety level in commercial seed markets, the 
share of SMTA-PGR derived varieties in each of these categories was treated as a parameter 
that could be varied in the simulations, with a range of plausible values derived from 
previous studies on the use of SMTA-PGR in commercial varieties in different crops in 
developed and developing countries.  
 
Therefore,  
(Commercial patented seed attracting BSF payments)ij = (Value of commercial seed market 
of patented varieties)ij x (SMTA share- patents)ij 
where (SMTA share-patents)ij = Value share of varieties incorporating SMTA-PGR in the 
commercial seed market for patented varieties in crop i in country j.  
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(Commercial PVP seed attracting BSF payments)ij = (Value of commercial seed market of 
PVP varieties)ij x (SMTA share- PVP)ij 
where (SMTA share-PVP)ij = Value share of varieties incorporating SMTA-PGR in the 
commercial seed market for PVP varieties in crop i in country j. 
(Commercial regulated seed attracting BSF payments)ij = (Value of commercial seed market 
of regulated varieties)ij x (SMTA share- Regulated)ij 
where (SMTA share-Regulated)ij = Value share of varieties incorporating SMTA-PGR in the 
commercial seed market for regulated varieties in crop i in country j. 
 
(e) Having derived the values of commercial patented seed, PVP seed and regulated seed 
attracting payments into the BSF for each Annex-I crop in the top 30 producers, we applied 
the payment rates for each category under different scenarios to derive the potential flows 
of revenue into the BSF.  
Parameter Values for Simulation of Payment Flows into the BSF 
The methodology described above for deriving the value of the commercial seed market that is likely to 
attract payment obligations under SMTAs relies on a number of critical parameters whose precise 
values are not known. To simulate the flow of options under different payment options, we have used 
plausible values of these parameters taken from previous studies and the literature related to the use of 
PGR exchanged under the MLS and its predecessor institutions (see Stannard and Moeller, 2012, which 
also provides references to the relevant literature). In the spreadsheet version of this model, the values 
of these parameters can be updated as more reliable information becomes available to derive more 
accurate projections of payment flows into the BSF. The values of the parameters used in the 
simulations are set out in Table-2 and are discussed below. While the value of each parameter can vary 
across crops and countries, to keep the analysis tractable we have used only two sets of parameters – 
one for all developed countries and another one for all developing countries.  
Table-2 : Parameter Values Used in Simulation of Payment Flows into the BSF 
Parameter Value in Developed 
Countries 
Value in Developing 
Countries 
Seed Replacement Rates   
Seed Replacement Rates- patented varieties 100% 80% 
Seed Replacement Rates- non-patented varieties 60% 20% 
Share in non-patented seed use   
Share of PVP varieties in commercial seed market of 
non-patented varieties 
100% 10% 
Share of (non-protected) regulated varieties in 
commercial seed market of non-patented varieties  
0% 90% 
Seed Price Factor –Agricultural Crops   
Seed Price Factor-patented varieties 4 4 
Seed Price Factor –PVP varieties 2.5 2.5 
Seed Price Factor- regulated varieties  2 2 
Share of varieties incorporating SMTA-PGR   
SMTA-share – patented varieties 5% 10% 
SMTA –share- PVP varieties 10% 15% 
SMTA-share- regulated varieties 15% 30% 
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 Seed Replacement Rates –patented varieties: For the purpose of this study we have assumed that only 
genetically modified varieties are likely to be subject to patents and further that patents for plant 
varieties will continue to be available only in a limited number of countries. The application of patents 
to plant varieties allows seed companies to proscribe the use of farm-saved seed of these varieties. 
Moreover, in developed countries, genetically modified varieties are marketed under contractual 
arrangements that effectively prevent the use of farm-saved seed by farmers, necessitating fresh 
purchase of seed by farmers for each round of planting. Therefore, for developed countries, we have 
assumed an SRR-patents rate of 100%. In developing countries, while the use of farm-saved seed may 
not be prohibited, the potential for the use of farm-saved seed of genetically modified varieties may be 
limited. This may arise as a result of genetic modification being incorporated into hybrid varieties (which 
requires fresh seed to be bought for every round of planting to retain “hybrid vigour”) or on account of 
seed companies’ marketing efforts to convince farmers that benefits of genetically modified varieties 
may be considerably diminished with the use of farm-saved seed. We have, therefore assumed a lower, 
but still high SRR-patent rate for developing countries of 80%. 
 
Seed Replacement Rates-non-patented varieties: Seed replacement rates for non-patented varieties are 
significantly different between developed and developing countries. In most developing countries, farm-
saved seed still constitutes the dominant proportion of seed use and commercial seed accounts only for 
10-20% of total seed use. The proportion of commercial seed use in developing countries is likely to 
increase over time as farmers adopt new commercial varieties and improved technologies and 
production becomes more market-oriented. In developed countries seed replacement rates for 
agricultural crops are much higher- and range from 50%-80% for non-hybrid varieties and nearly 100% 
for hybrid varieties [NIAB, 1990-2000]. In Europe, seed replacement rates for cereal crops which were as 
high as 80-90% in the 1990s in some countries (e.g., UK) appear to have declined over the last 15 years 
after the introduction of PVP royalties on farm-saved seed of protected varieties facilitated by 
provisions in the EU-wide PVP legislation (European Council, 1994) For the purpose of simulation of 
flows into the BSF we have assumed that SRR for non-patented varieties of 60% in developed countries 
and 20% in developing countries.  
 
PVP and Regulated Varieties’ Share: In developed countries plant variety protection has been in 
existence for three to four decades. In these countries, nearly all new plant variety innovations are 
protected by PVP. Therefore, for developed countries we have assumed that the PVP share of non-
patented seed use is 100% - reflecting the near universal use of PVP for new varieties. In most 
developing countries, PVP systems are yet to be introduced or their introduction has been very recent 
(in the last 5-10 years) and is not well established. A large part of plant variety innovations in in use 
developing countries may have been contributed by the public sector NARS and may not have been 
subject to PVP. We have assumed, therefore, that the PVP share of commercial non-patented seed use 
in developing countries is currently unlikely to exceed 10% although this share may increase over time 
with the wider adoption and enforcement of PVP legislation. We have further assumed that the 
remaining 90% of commercial non-patented seed use in developing countries will fall under the 
category of regulated varieties, subject to quality control and marketing regulations.  
 
Seed Price Factor: The SPF is a parameter which expresses the price of seed as a multiple of the 
producer price of the agricultural crop. An examination of producer prices and seed prices for wheat in 
a number of developed and developing countries shows that SPF has a value of around 2; that is, seed 
prices on average tend to be twice the producer price for the crop. Seed prices of protected varieties 
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are generally higher than the seed prices of non-protected varieties. There is some evidence to show 
that varieties protected by PVP command a relatively small premium over non-protected varieties 
(Lesser, 1994). However, genetically modified (patented) varieties are considerably more expensive that 
conventional varieties and often involve the payment of a substantial premium in the form of a 
“technology fee”. Based on an examination of cereal seed prices in developed country markets, we have 
adopted the following SPF values in our simulations for all agricultural crops, except vegetable crops. 
 
SPF for patented varieties:    4 
SPF for PVP varieties:             2.5 
SPF for (non-protected) regulated varieties:  2 
 
The above SPF values are not applicable to vegetable crops because SPF values for vegetable crops are 
of an entirely different order of magnitude. For instance, average producer prices for carrots may be 
around US$ 300 per tonne, but carrot seed prices can range between US $ 20-30,000 per tonne, giving 
an SPF or 100. For vegetable crops we have estimated the SPF by examining the seed use rates per 
hectare, the seeds per gram and bulk seed prices in developed country markets. The SPF values used in 
the simulations for Annex-I vegetable crops are as follows: 
Table-3:  Seed Price Factors for Annex-I Vegetable Crops 
Vegetable crop SPF-patented varieties SPF-PVP varieties SPF-regulated varieties 
Asparagus 96 60 48 
Beet 1600 1000 800 
Carrots 160 100 80 
Cabbage 160 100 80 
Eggplant 240 160 120 
 
The extraordinarily high large SPF values for vegetable crops highlight the importance of these crops in 
determining the potential flow of payments into the BSF. 
 
SMTA share: The non-availability of variety level information from commercial seed markets means that 
there are no reliable data on the share of SMTA-PGR derived varieties in the commercial seed market 
for patented, PVP and regulated varieties. For our simulations, we have relied on parameter values 
derived from previous studies that have examined the share of varieties incorporating material accessed 
from the MLS in selected crops (wheat, rice and maize) in developed and developing countries 
(Stannard and Moeller, 2012). The current share of varieties that incorporate material sources from the 
MLS (and predecessor institutions) in commercial seed markets can provide some pointers to the 
potential share of SMTA-PGR derived varieties over time. A number of considerations are relevant in 
setting the SMTA-share parameter values. Firstly, the largest users of the SMTA-PGR are the NARS in 
developing countries and the CGIAR centres themselves (which undertake breeding work aimed at 
developing country environments). Therefore, the largest share of innovations incorporating SMTA-PGR 
is likely to come from innovations developed for developing countries. In most developing countries the 
public sector NARS still plays a dominant role in plant breeding for agricultural crops. Most developing 
countries have either no intellectual property regime for plant varieties (patents or PVP) or else have 
only recently introduced PVP legislation (Deere, 2008). In developing countries where PVP has been 
introduced the extent to which the public sector/NARS will choose to participate in the PVP system is 
not yet clear. Therefore, while most of the innovations derived from the use of SMTA-PGR are likely to 
emerge in developing countries, only a small proportion of these innovations is likely to be protected by 
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any form of intellectual property rights. The use of SMTA-PGR by developed countries and the private 
sector is much less when compared to use by CGIAR centres and developing countries. The use of 
SMTA-PGR in the development of genetically modified (patented) varieties is likely to be limited as 
genetic modifications are likely to be applied to well-established varieties14 and may not involve the use 
of new material sourced from the MLS. Even for conventionally bred varieties protected by PVP in 
developed countries, the private sector may largely rely on their own PGR collections and breeding lines 
(or varieties available for further breeding and research under the researchers’ exemption available 
under PVP) rather than source new material from the MLS using SMTAs. Given the history of 
dissemination of PGR from the CGIAR centres and international PGR exchange over the last four 
decades, it is likely that characteristics/traits of interest in MLS-PGR may have been largely assimilated 
into in-house collections and commercial varieties in developed countries – reducing the need for 
accessing PGR using SMTAs. In setting the values for the SMTA share parameter, we have, therefore, 
assumed that: 
 
SMTA-share in developing countries > SMTA-share in developed countries 
 
and 
 
SMTA-share for patented varieties < SMTA-share for PVP varieties < SMTA-share for regulated varieties.  
 
Based on these assumptions and a review of previous studies on the use of PGR sourced from the MLS 
(including its predecessor institutions), we have used the following values of SMTA-share in our analysis. 
 
Table-4: Share of SMTA derived PGR in different Seed Market Product Categories 
 SMTA-share  
–Patented varieties 
SMTA-share  
- PVP varieties 
SMTA-share 
- Regulated varieties 
Developed countries 5% 10% 15% 
 
Developing countries 10% 15% 30% 
 
 
Payment Flows Into Bsf: Simulation Results 
Option1: Baseline or Status Quo Option 
The annual flow of payments into the BSF in the baseline scenario has been estimated based on the size 
of the commercial seed market for different Annex-I crops in 2011 using the methodology described 
above and assuming that (1) only patented varieties incorporating SMTA-PGR will attract mandatory 
payment obligations at the rate of 0.77% under Article 6.7 of the SMTA (2) PVP protected varieties and 
other varieties incorporating SMTA-PGR will attract only voluntary payment obligations under Article 
6.8 of the SMTA and (3) payments under Article 6.11 of the SMTA will be at the rate of 0.5% of the sales 
of all seeds of the crop for which SMTA-PGR has been accessed, whether or not the product is protected 
any any IPRs . It should be noted that owing to data constraints, horticultural crops (fruits, breadfruit 
and coconuts) have been excluded from the analysis and, therefore, the estimates presented here do 
                                                          
14
 These established varieties may have been developed using material accessed from the MLS prior to the entry 
into force of the Treaty.  
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not include potential payment flows into the BSF in relation to PGR accessed from the MLS for these 
crops. The estimates of potential payment flows presented are based on the values of key parameters 
assumed, which are different for developed and developing countries. The realisable flows in to the BSF 
will be dependent on the “performance factor” or the proportion of payment obligations that will be 
translated into actual payment flows into the BSF, as discussed later. The estimated potential for 
mandatory payments into the BSF is presented in Table-5. 
Table -5: Option 1: Mandatory Payments into the BSF-(US $ million) 
 
Potential annual mandatory payments under Article 6.7 
(patented varieties) 
Crop 
Developed 
countries 
(DCs) 
Developing 
countries 
(LDCs) Total potential 
Maize 2.601 3.413 6.014 
Rapeseed 0.053 0.000 0.053 
 TOTAL  2.653 3.413 6.067 
 
The current potential for mandatory payments into the BSF is estimated at US $ 6.06 million. This figure 
derived from only two crops reflects our assumption that only genetically modified varieties are likely to 
be subject to patents and that such patents will be available only in a limited number of countries. 
Among Annex-I crops, only maize and oilseed rape have seen the significant introduction and adoption 
of genetically modified varieties. Further, the development of genetically modified varieties through the 
application of biotechnology may not require the use of SMTA-PGR, i.e., material accessed from the 
MLS after the coming into force of the International Treaty. The contribution of US $ 3.413 million from 
developing countries is related to the significant adoption of genetically modified maize in South Africa 
and Brazil. This however, assumes that genetically modified varieties can be protected by patents in 
these countries. While both South Africa and Brazil appear to allow for dual protection of genetically 
modified varieties through patents and PVP (Hirko, 2012; Rodrigues et al., 2011), this may not be the 
case in other developing countries.  
The potential for voluntary payments under Article 6.8 in the baseline scenario (assuming that voluntary 
payments are made at the same rate as in Article 6.7) is presented in Table-6. The total potential for 
voluntary payments is nearly US $53 million per annum. Of this only US $ 10.6 million is associated with 
PVP protected varieties, nearly 80% of which is accounted for by developed countries – reflecting the 
wider adoption and use of PVP in developed countries. The largest share (US $ 42.4 million) of voluntary 
payment obligations is associated with non-protected plant variety innovations in developing countries. 
This reflects the substantial use of SMTA-PGR by developing country NARS and CGIAR centres which do 
breeding work aimed at developing country environments.  
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Table-6: Scenario 1: Voluntary Payments into the BSF-(US $ million) 
 Potential voluntary payments under Article 6.8 from plant variety 
innovations incorporating SMTA-PGR 
PVP varieties Non-protected varieties 
 
DCs LDCs 
Total 
potential DCs LDCs Total potential 
Wheat 2.165 0.351 2.515 0.000 5.050 5.050 
Rice 0.264 0.389 0.653 0.000 5.608 5.608 
Maize 1.174 0.824 1.999 0.000 11.872 11.872 
Barley 0.793 0.064 0.856 0.000 0.915 0.915 
Oats 0.218 0.017 0.235 0.000 0.244 0.244 
Rye 0.155 0.006 0.161 0.000 0.086 0.086 
Triticale 0.131 0.003 0.134 0.000 0.038 0.038 
Millet 0.002 0.014 0.015 0.000 0.200 0.200 
Sorghum 0.007 0.014 0.021 0.000 0.200 0.200 
Beans 0.043 0.047 0.091 0.000 0.681 0.681 
Pigeonpea 0.000 0.014 0.014 0.000 0.207 0.207 
Chickpea 0.019 0.018 0.037 0.000 0.256 0.256 
Peas 0.116 0.011 0.127 0.000 0.161 0.161 
Cowpeas 0.003 0.017 0.019 0.000 0.244 0.244 
Lentils 0.063 0.005 0.068 0.000 0.073 0.073 
Rapeseed 0.091 0.015 0.105 0.000 0.209 0.209 
Mustard 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.004 
Sunflower 0.021 0.018 0.039 0.000 0.255 0.255 
Potatoes 1.261 0.414 1.675 0.000 5.960 5.960 
Sweet 
Potatoes 0.085 0.129 0.214 0.000 1.863 1.863 
Cassava 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Taro 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Yams 0.024 0.461 0.485 0.000 6.640 6.640 
Asparagus 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.005 
Beet 1.061 0.108 1.168 0.000 1.548 1.548 
Carrots 0.026 0.006 0.032 0.000 0.090 0.090 
Cabbages 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.011 0.011 
Eggplant 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.027 0.027 
 TOTAL  7.725 2.948 10.673 0.000 42.445 42.445 
 
Table-7 presents the potential revenue flows into the BSF on the assumption that all seed industry 
players access SMTA-PGR and opt for payments under Article 6.11 of the SMTA. The potential payments 
to the BSF under these assumptions would be US $211 million which is considerably higher than the 
projections of mandatory payments under Article 6.7 and voluntary payments under Article 6.8 of the 
SMTA.  The assumption of universal of adoption of Article 6.11 by all seed industry players at the 
current rates of payment is clearly not a realistic one, especially when mandatory payment obligations 
under Article 6.7 and voluntary payment obligations under Article 6.8 are much lower. The figure of US 
$ 211 million is simply 0.5% of the commercial seed market value of Annex–I crops and provides a 
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theoretical upper bound for potential payment flows into BSF. The potential revenue flows under this 
assumption are presented only to highlight the skewed economic incentive structure built into the 
SMTA influencing the choice of payment options. While the universal adoption of Article 6.11 payments 
would clearly yield much larger revenue flows into the BSF, the current payment rates under Article 6.7 
and Article 6.11 are so structured that no seed industry player is likely to have an economic incentive to 
opt for Article 6.11 payments.  
Table-7:  Scenario 1: Payments into BSF under Universal Adoption of Article 6.11 Option- (US $ 
million) 
 Projected payments into the BSF under the assumption 
universal use of SMTA-PGR and Article 6.11 payment 
option (payment rate of 0.5% on sales of all commercial 
seed)  
 
DCs LDCs 
Total 
potential 
Wheat 14.055 12.448 26.503 
Rice 1.713 13.824 15.537 
Maize 41.403 51.429 92.832 
Barley 5.147 2.255 7.402 
Oats 1.415 0.602 2.016 
Rye 1.004 0.213 1.217 
Triticale 0.851 0.094 0.946 
Millet 0.010 0.492 0.502 
Sorghum 0.044 0.494 0.538 
Beans 0.282 1.680 1.961 
Pigeonpea 0.000 0.509 0.510 
Chickpea 0.124 0.631 0.755 
Peas 0.755 0.398 1.153 
Cowpeas 0.016 0.602 0.618 
Lentils 0.407 0.179 0.586 
Rapeseed 1.273 0.516 1.789 
Mustard 0.014 0.009 0.022 
Sunflower 0.137 0.628 0.765 
Potatoes 8.190 14.691 22.881 
Sweet Potatoes 0.549 4.592 5.141 
Cassava 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Taro 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Yams 0.153 16.369 16.522 
Asparagus 0.007 0.012 0.019 
Beet 6.887 3.817 10.703 
Carrots 0.167 0.221 0.388 
Cabbages 0.012 0.026 0.038 
Eggplant 0.012 0.066 0.078 
 TOTAL 84.625 126.796 211.421 
 
The skewed incentive structure of the current payment options under the SMTA can be illustrated 
through a “parity point” calculation which: 
25 
 
(a) Calculates a payment rate under the provisions of Article 6.7 and Article 6.8 of the current 
SMTA that would yield the same quantum of payments into the BSF as Article 6.11 (assuming 
universal adoption) or alternatively, 
(b)  Calculates a payment rate under Article 6.11 (assuming universal adoption) that would yield the 
same revenue as current payment rates applicable under Article 6.7 and Article 6.8. 
In the status quo option, the potential revenues from universal adoption of Article 6.11 are US $ 211 
million. To generate the same revenue from mandatory payments under Article 6.7, and voluntary 
payments under Article 6.8 (with the current coverage of product categories under each Article) the 
payment rates under these articles would have to rise to 8-10% of seed sales of patented and PVP 
SMTA-PGR derived varieties from the current level of 0.77%. Alternatively, to generate the same level of 
revenue as provided in the baseline scenario by mandatory payments under Article 6.7 and voluntary 
payments under Article 6.8, the rate of payment under Article 6.11 could be lowered to 0.175-0.25% 
from the current level of 0.5% with payment obligations being applied only on commercial sales of 
patented and PVP varieties. The “parity point” calculations demonstrate that under the current SMTA 
provisions and payment rates, SMTA-users will have no incentive to opt for the Article 6.11 option. 
Developing a more balanced structure of incentives influencing selection of payment options under the 
SMTA would, therefore, call for either very sharp increases in payment rates under Article 6.7 and 
Article 6.8 or a significant reduction in payment obligations under Article 6.11. As sharp increases in 
payment rates under Article 6.7 and Article 6.8 are likely to be unacceptable to the seed industry and 
other SMTA-users, incentivising the adoption Article 6.11 through lowered payment obligations may 
represent the most feasible route for enhancing payment flows into the BSF.  
Option 2: Revisiting Article 6.7 
Under this option we consider the extension of mandatory payments to product categories which 
currently do not attract mandatory payment obligations. We consider two scenarios. 
Scenario 1- Extension of mandatory payments to PVP products: In the first scenario under this option, 
we consider the extension of mandatory payments to product innovations incorporating SMTA-PGR 
which are protected by PVP (in addition to patented innovations). We also allow payment rates for 
mandatory payments under Article 6.7 to vary by product category – that is, we allow for a different 
rate for patented and PVP varieties, with a higher rate for patented varieties.  
Table-8: Option 2 – Extension of Mandatory Payments to PVP Products – Payment Rates 
 Article 6.7 
(Patented and PVP varieties attract mandatory payments) 
 Payment rates 
(Applicable to sales of seed of varieties incorporating SMTA-PGR) 
Case 1 Patented varieties:  0.77% 
PVP varieties:           0.77% 
 
Case 2 Patented varieties:   1.1% 
PVP varieties:             0.5% 
 
Case 3 Patented varieties:   1.1% 
PVP varieties:             0.2% 
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Case 1 involves bringing PVP varieties under the purview of mandatory payments with the current 
payment rate of 0.77% being applied. The effect of this would be the conversion of voluntary 
payments for PVP varieties estimated in Table-6 (US $ 10.67 million) into mandatory payments. 
There would be no change to the voluntary payments from non-protected varieties estimated in 
Table-6. The potential payment flows in Case 2 and Case 3 are presented in Table-9 below: 
 
 
Table -9: Option 2 Extension of Mandatory Payments to PVP Products– Payment Flows into BSF-(US $ 
million) 
CASE 2 Potential mandatory payments 
under Article 6.7 (patented 
varieties) 
Potential mandatory payments 
under Article 6.7 (PVP varieties) 
1.10% 0.50% 
DCs LDCs 
Total 
potential  DCs LDCs 
Total 
potential  
Wheat 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.406 0.228 1.633 
Rice 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.171 0.253 0.424 
Maize 3.715 4.876 8.592 0.763 0.535 1.298 
Barley 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.515 0.041 0.556 
Oats 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.141 0.011 0.152 
Rye 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.100 0.004 0.104 
Triticale 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.085 0.002 0.087 
Millet 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.009 0.010 
Sorghum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.009 0.013 
Beans 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.031 0.059 
Pigeonpea 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.009 
Chickpea 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.012 0.024 
Peas 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.075 0.007 0.083 
Cowpeas 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.011 0.013 
Lentils 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.041 0.003 0.044 
Rapeseed 0.075 0.000 0.075 0.059 0.009 0.068 
Mustard 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 
Sunflower 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.011 0.025 
Potatoes 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.819 0.269 1.088 
Sweet Potatoes 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.055 0.084 0.139 
Cassava 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Taro 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Yams 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.299 0.315 
Asparagus 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Beet 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.689 0.070 0.758 
Carrots 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.004 0.021 
Cabbages 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 
Eggplant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 
TOTAL 3.791 4.876 8.667 5.017 1.914 6.931 
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CASE 3 Potential mandatory payments 
under Article 6.7 (patented 
varieties) 
Potential mandatory payments 
under Article 6.7 (PVP varieties) 
1.10% 0.20% 
DCs LDCs 
Total 
potential  DCs LDCs 
Total 
potential  
Wheat 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.562 0.091 0.653 
Rice 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.069 0.101 0.170 
Maize 3.715 4.876 8.592 0.305 0.214 0.519 
Barley 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.206 0.016 0.222 
Oats 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.057 0.004 0.061 
Rye 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.040 0.002 0.042 
Triticale 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.034 0.001 0.035 
Millet 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.004 
Sorghum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.005 
Beans 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.012 0.024 
Pigeonpea 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.004 
Chickpea 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.010 
Peas 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.003 0.033 
Cowpeas 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.005 
Lentils 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.001 0.018 
Rapeseed 0.075 0.000 0.075 0.024 0.004 0.027 
Mustard 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Sunflower 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.010 
Potatoes 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.328 0.107 0.435 
Sweet Potatoes 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.034 0.056 
Cassava 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Taro 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Yams 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.120 0.126 
Asparagus 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Beet 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.275 0.028 0.303 
Carrots 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.008 
Cabbages 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Eggplant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
TOTAL  3.791 4.876 8.667 2.007 0.766 2.772 
 
It should be noted that for Case 2 and Case 3, the rate of 1.1% under Article 6.7 for patented varieties 
has been derived by dropping the 30% deduction allowed for marketing and sales cost in the current 
structure of payment rates. Payment rates for PVP varieties under Article 6.7 are set at lower levels at 
0.5% in Case 2 and 0.2% in Case 3.  
In Case 2, the potential for mandatory payments would be US $ 15.59 million of which US $ 6.93 million 
(44%) would come from PVP varieties and US $ 8.66 million (56%) would come from patented varieties. 
This would be considerably higher than the potential for mandatory payments assessed in Option 1. 
Nearly 72% of the payments for PVP varieties would come from developed country SMTA-users 
reflecting well-established PVP systems in these countries, where most commercial plant variety 
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innovations are subject to some form of protection. In Case 3, with a lower payment rate of 0.2% 
applied to PVP varieties, the potential for mandatory payments would be US $ 11.44 million with PVP 
varieties contributing US $ 2.72 million (24%) and patented varieties contributing US $ 8.66 million 
(76%). Again nearly 72% of the payments for PVP varieties would come from developed countries.  
The main implication of the analysis of Scenario 1 is that the extension of mandatory payments to PVP 
varieties will result in a very significant expansion of the innovation base from which payments into the 
BSF are derived. A large part (nearly 80%) of the enhanced payment flows in this scenario will come 
from SMTA-users in developed countries. The enhancement in mandatory payment flows from the 
inclusion of PVP varieties will be very significant even if a relatively low rate of payment is applied to 
PVP varieties.  
Scenario 2-Extension of mandatory payments to PVP and regulated products: In this scenario, we 
consider the extension of mandatory payment obligations to both PVP-protected and regulated 
varieties. As discussed earlier, regulated varieties are plant variety innovations incorporating SMTA-PGR, 
which are not protected by any form of intellectual property rights – but are subject to seed quality 
control and marketing regulations and seed multiplication systems that require access to “breeder 
seed” of the variety. Seed production norms, quality control and marketing regulations facilitate and 
sustain the commercial exploitation of these varieties. In this scenario, while bringing regulated varieties 
under the purview of mandatory payments, we allow for payment rates under Article 6.7 to vary by 
product category. The highest payment rates are applied to patented varieties; lower rates are applied 
to PVP varieties while the lowest rates are applied to regulated varieties not subject to any form of 
intellectual property rights. We project the flows into the BSF under the following sets of rates. 
Table-10: Option 2 –Extension of Mandatory Payments to PVP and Regulated Products-Payment Rates 
 Article 6.7 
(Patented, PVP and regulated varieties attract mandatory payments) 
 Payment rates 
(Applicable to sales of seed of varieties incorporating SMTA-PGR) 
Case 1 Patented varieties:  0.77% 
PVP varieties:           0.77% 
Regulated varieties  0.77% 
 
Case 2 Patented varieties:   1.1% 
PVP varieties:             0.5% 
Regulated varieties   0.2% 
 
 
Case 1 involves bring PVP and regulated varieties under the purview of mandatory payments with the 
current payment rate of 0.77% being applied to all product categories. The effect of this would be the 
conversion of voluntary payments for PVP and (non protected) regulated varieties estimated in Table-6 
(Option 1) into mandatory payments. The potential for mandatory payments from regulated varieties 
would be US $ 42.44 million, which would be considerably higher than mandatory payments from PVP 
varieties (US $ 10.67 million). In this scenario, there would be no voluntary payment obligations as all 
product categories attract mandatory payment obligations. The projected payment flows in Case 2 are 
presented in Table-11 below. Payment rates for PVP varieties and regulated varieties under Article 6.7 
are set at 0.5% and 0.2% reflecting the lower potential for appropriating economic returns from 
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innovations that are subject to weaker forms of intellectual property protection or are not subject to 
intellectual property protection at all. 
 Table -11-Option 2- Extension of Mandatory Payments to PVP and Regulated Products- Payments into 
BSF (US $ million) 
 
Projected Mandatory Payments under Article 6.7 
Patented Varieties PVP varieties Regulated varieties 
1.1% 0.5% 0.2% 
DCs LDCs 
Total 
potential DCs LDCs 
Total 
potenti
al DCs LDCs 
Total 
potential 
Wheat 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.406 0.228 1.633 0.000 1.312 1.312 
Rice 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.171 0.253 0.424 0.000 1.457 1.457 
Maize 3.715 4.876 8.592 0.763 0.535 1.298 0.000 3.084 3.084 
Barley 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.515 0.041 0.556 0.000 0.238 0.238 
Oats 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.141 0.011 0.152 0.000 0.063 0.063 
Rye 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.100 0.004 0.104 0.000 0.022 0.022 
Triticale 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.085 0.002 0.087 0.000 0.010 0.010 
Millet 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.009 0.010 0.000 0.052 0.052 
Sorghum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.009 0.013 0.000 0.052 0.052 
Beans 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.031 0.059 0.000 0.177 0.177 
Pigeonpea 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.009 0.000 0.054 0.054 
Chickpea 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.012 0.024 0.000 0.066 0.066 
Peas 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.075 0.007 0.083 0.000 0.042 0.042 
Cowpeas 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.011 0.013 0.000 0.063 0.063 
Lentils 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.041 0.003 0.044 0.000 0.019 0.019 
Rapeseed 0.075 0.000 0.075 0.059 0.009 0.068 0.000 0.054 0.054 
Mustard 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Sunflower 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.011 0.025 0.000 0.066 0.066 
Potatoes 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.819 0.269 1.088 0.000 1.548 1.548 
Sweet 
Potatoes 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.055 0.084 0.139 0.000 0.484 0.484 
Cassava 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Taro 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Yams 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.299 0.315 0.000 1.725 1.725 
Asparagus 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Beet 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.689 0.070 0.758 0.000 0.402 0.402 
Carrots 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.004 0.021 0.000 0.023 0.023 
Cabbages 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.003 
Eggplant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.007 0.007 
TOTAL  3.791 4.876 8.667 5.017 1.914 6.931 0.000 11.025 11.025 
 
In Case 2 the total potential for mandatory payments would be US $ 26.62 million with US $ 11.02 
million (42%) coming from regulated varieties, US $ 6.9 million (26%) coming from PVP varieties and US 
$ 8.66 million (32%) coming from patented varieties. Although nearly 72% of payments related to PVP 
varieties would still come from developed countries, in this scenario the largest share of mandatory 
payments (67%) would come from developing countries. The large share of developing countries in this 
scenario would reflect the size of the seed markets in these countries and the role of SMTA-PGR derived 
plant variety innovations in these markets.  
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The results from Option 2 highlight the fact that the current architecture of payment options under the 
SMTA relies on a very narrow sub-set of innovations derived from SMTA-PGR for generating mandatory 
payments. Patent-protected innovations constitute a very small proportion of innovations generated 
through the use of SMTA-PGR. As observed in Scenario 1, the extension of mandatory payments to PVP 
varieties would significantly broaden the base for innovations generating inflows into the BSF. However, 
Scenario 2 shows that even extension to PVP varieties would leave out a very significant proportion of 
innovations derived from SMTA-PGR that are commercially exploited. If the intention behind the 
architecture of payment options in the SMTA is that benefit-sharing payments should be triggered by 
commercial exploitation of innovations incorporating SMTA-PGR, then there may be a strong case for 
not restricting the set of innovations to those protected by intellectual property rights and for adopting 
a wider definition of commercial use.  
Option 3 – Revisiting Article 6.11 
We have note above that the universal adoption of the Article 6.11 option by all SMTA users can 
generate quicker and larger flows of payments into the BSF. However, given the current structure of 
payment obligations and payment rates under the SMTA, payment obligations under Article 6.11 would 
be larger by several orders of magnitude than payment obligations under Article 6.7 and Article 6.8. This 
implies that given the current structure of payment rates, SMTA-users would have no incentive to opt 
for Article 6.11. If SMTA users are to be incentivised to opt for Article 6.11, then payment obligations 
under Article 6.11 will need to be drastically reduced. The reduction in payment obligations under 
Article 6.11 can be brought about by: 
(1) Narrowing the product categories to which payment obligations apply under Article 6.11 
(2) Reducing the payment rates applicable to different product categories.  
We have examined the potential for payment flows into the BSF under the scenarios for revisiting 
Article 6.11 described in Table-12. These scenarios assume universal use of SMTA-PGR by the seed the 
industry and universal adoption of Article 6.11 by all SMTA users. If payment obligations under these 
scenarios remain larger than the payment obligations under the revised Article 6.7, then SMTA users 
will still have no incentive to opt for Article 6.11. We, therefore, make the further assumption that in 
the scenarios described in Table-12, Article 6.11 would be the sole payment option (i.e., Article 6.7 and 
Article 6.8 would not be available to SMTA users). The payment rates for different product categories 
are assumed to be the same ratio as payment rates in the corresponding scenarios for revision of Article 
6.7. While Scenario A corresponds to the status quo option, in Scenarios B and C it has been assumed 
that the current rate of 0.5% would apply only to patented products, with lower rates being applicable 
for other product categories.  
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Table-12 – Revisiting Article 6.11- Scenarios and Payment Rates 
 Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
Products categories 
attracting Article 6.11 
payments 
 
Sales of all seed 
relating to crop for 
which SMTA-PGR 
has been accessed 
 
Sales of all patented and 
PVP seeds of crop for 
which SMTA-PGR has been 
accessed 
 
Sales of all patented, 
PVP and regulated 
seeds of crop for which 
SMTA-PGR has been 
accessed 
Payment rates  (1) (2)  
Patented products  
 
 
           0.5% 
0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 
 
PVP products 0.23% 0.09% 0.23% 
 
Regulated (non-
protected) products 
 
Nil 
 
Nil 
 
0.09% 
Corresponding 
revision of Article 6.7 
scenario for 
comparison 
 
Status quo 
 
Extension of mandatory 
payments to PVP products 
Extension of 
mandatory payments 
to PVP and regulated 
products 
 
The projected payments into the BSF under universal participation in Article 6.11 in Scenarios A , B and 
C are summarised in Table-13. 
Table-13: Projected Payments into BSF under Article 6.11 for Different Scenarios (US $ million) 
 Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
  (1) (2)  
Developed countries 
(DCs) 
84.625 
 
57.262 
 
43.581 
 
57.264 
 
Developing countries 
(LDCs) 
126.796 
 
27.964 
 
24.484 
 
44.671 
 
Total payment 
potential under Article 
6.11 
211.421 
 
85.226 
 
68.065 
 
101.934 
 
Potential for mandatory 
payments under 
corresponding Article 
6.7 scenario 
6.067 15.59 11.44 26.62 
 
In the all the above scenarios, the potential for payments into the BSF with Article 6.11 as the sole 
option is much larger than the mandatory payments generated by corresponding revisions to Article 
6.7. In Scenarios B and C, although the gap between the potential for mandatory payments under 
Article 6.7 and potential payments from universal participation in Article 6.11 is smaller than under 
status quo, the potential payments under Article 6.11 (even with restriction of product categories and 
lower rates of payment) remain of a much higher order of magnitude than payments under Article 6.7. 
This again highlights the case for a significant reduction in payment obligations under Article 6.11 if 
SMTA-users are to be incentivised to opt for it. 
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Making Article 6.11 the sole payment option for SMTA-users with existing rates of payment is likely to 
have large adverse effects on the use of SMTA-PGR by seed industry players over the medium and long 
term. From a static perspective, making Article 6.11 the only option for SMTA-users would appear to 
have potential to boost payment flows into the BSF, which would be significantly larger than the 
mandatory payments expected under the different scenarios. We have already noted that the large 
divergence between mandatory payments under Article 6.7 and payments under Article 6.11 imply that 
SMTA-users would have little incentive to opt for Article 6.11. If SMTA-users are to be persuaded to opt 
for Article 6.11 without hampering the future uptake of PGR from the MLS, then Article 6.11 needs to 
be made “revenue neutral” – that is, payment obligations under Article 6.11 must not be larger than 
mandatory payment obligations under Article 6.7. In our static analysis scenarios, this can be achieved if 
the rate of payment under Article 6.11 is lowered to around 0.2% and only product categories covered 
by patents and PVP are subject to payment obligations. Therefore, to persuade SMTA-users to opt for 
Article 6.11 or making “Article 6.11 as the sole payment option” acceptable to SMTA-users, the rates of 
payment under Article 6.11 would need to be sharply lowered.  
Option 4: Expansion of Annex-I to all Crops 
In this scenario we will examine the implications for potential payment flows into the BSF if Annex-I of 
the International Treaty is expanded to cover all crops. While we do not have data on the full range of 
food, fodder and industrial crops, we will illustrate the potential impacts of expansion of Annex-I on 
payment flows into the BSF by examining the effects of inclusion of some key crops which are currently 
excluded from Annex-I. The crops that we will consider are: 
1. Tomatoes 
2. Onions 
3. Soybean 
4. Cotton 
 
Table-14: Option 4- Payments into BSF- Impact of Expansion of Crop Coverage in Annex-I 
 
Mandatory payments under 
Article 6.7 (patented varieties) 
Voluntary payments under 
Article 6.8 (PVP varieties) 
Voluntary payments under 
Article 6.8 (Regulated 
varieties) 
 
DCs LDCs 
Total 
potential  DCs LDCs 
Total 
potential  DCs LDCs 
Total 
potential  
Soybeans 1.711 2.037 3.747 0.138 0.058 0.196 0.000 0.832 0.832 
Cotton 0.186 1.120 1.305 0.030 0.012 0.042 0.000 0.173 0.173 
Tomatoes 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.242 0.093 0.336 0.000 1.343 1.343 
Onions 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.205 0.257 0.462 0.000 3.700 3.700 
TOTAL 1.896 3.156 5.053 0.615 0.420 1.036 0.000 6.048 6.048 
All current 
Annex-I 
crops 2.65 3.41 6.07 7.73 2.95 10.67 0.00 42.44 42.44 
 
Table-14 shows the potential payments into the BSF from the inclusion of the four crops in Annex-I with 
the current payment obligations and rates of payment (Option 1). The table also compares the potential 
payments from these four crops to the total potential flows from all current Annex-I crops. It may be 
seen from Table-14 that the largest effect of inclusion of the four crops in Annex-I will be on mandatory 
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payments under Article 6.7. This is on account of the large global area share for genetically modified 
varieties of soybean and cotton which we assume to be patented products. The potential flows into the 
BSF from the inclusion of soybean and cotton are estimated at US $ 5.05 million which is 85% of the 
total potential flows from all crops currently included in Annex-I. It is interesting that the potential for 
voluntary payments in respect of PVP-protected varieties of tomatoes is larger than potential voluntary 
payments from PVP-protected varieties of soybean and cotton This is on account of the extraordinarily 
high seed price factor (SPF) for tomatoes (tomato seeds are priced at US $ 100-300,000 per tonne) with 
the commercial seed market for tomatoes valued at nearly US $ 1.6 billion in 2013 (MarketsandMarkets, 
2013). Onions also command a high seed price factor (with seed prices of nearly US $ 160,000 per 
tonne). It should, however, be noted that our estimated potential flows from onions may be overstated 
because the analysis assumes that all onions will be planted from seeds. In practice, a large proportion 
of the onion crop is planted from “onion-sets” or bulbs that cost significantly less- which implies that the 
size of the commercial market for onion seed may be much lower than what we have projected in the 
simulation. The potential for voluntary payments from non-protected varieties of the four crops is 
estimated at US $6.05 million. This again highlights the role of SMTA-PGR in commercial plant variety 
innovations not protected by any form of intellectual property rights in developing country markets.  
Our analysis demonstrates that the expansion of Annex-I to include all crops will substantially enhance 
the potential for payment flows into the BSF. The potential for mandatory payments will be significantly 
impacted by the inclusion of crops that have seen significant application of genetic modification or 
biotechnology in the development of innovations. The development and large scale adoption of 
genetically modified vegetable crops in the future may further enhance the potential for mandatory 
payments. There is also significant potential for payment flows from PVP-protected varieties of high 
value vegetable crops where the seed price to commodity price ratios tend to be radically different from 
that of cereals crops. The inclusion of high value vegetable crops in Annex-I will also have the effect of 
bringing the most profitable and dynamic sector of the plant breeding industry within the ambit of 
SMTA-mediated exchange of PGR and provide a major stimulus to innovation through more intensive 
use of PGR available in the MLS.  
Performance Factor 
The figures for payments into the BSF projected in the scenarios described above reflect the potential 
for payment flows based on the current size of the commercial seed markets for different crops and an 
assessment of the shares of varieties incorporating SMTA-PGR for each crop. The extent to which the 
potential is realised will depend on the “performance factor” – i.e., the proportion of the potential for 
payment for different product categories that translates into actual payment flows into the BSF. The 
current architecture of the SMTA relies entirely on SMTA-users to monitor the use of SMTA-PGR in 
different commercialised products, accurately assess the quantum of payment obligations under the 
SMTA and effect the payments in a timely fashion. In the case of voluntary payments under Article 6.8 
of the SMTA, SMTA-users are only “strongly encouraged” to make payments into the BSF. The BSF has 
thus far not received any mandatory or voluntary payments related to the use of SMTA-PGR in 
commercial products, although our analysis clearly shows that such payment obligations may subsist in 
the current global seed market. A large gap between potential and actual flows into the BSF may persist 
even when the innovative options suggested by the Working Group are implemented. This suggests that 
in addition to modifying the structure of payment obligations under the SMTA for enhancing payment 
flows, it may also be necessary to revisit the exclusive reliance on user-adherence to contractual 
obligations under the SMTA. While monitoring/audit of individual SMTA-users may be clearly infeasible 
and not in consonance with the spirit of the International Treaty, there may be a strong case for the 
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Treaty to undertake a systematic review of the use of MLS-PGR in commercialised plant variety 
innovations periodically. Such periodic reviews would not only provide updated information on the 
contribution of MLS-PGR to the plant variety innovation in both developed and developing countries, 
but would also support user-adherence to contractual obligations under the SMTAs. Collection and 
dissemination of information on the contribution of the MLS to plant variety innovations can be 
expected to provide a strong stimulus to the realisation of payment flows into the BSF.  
Till such time as reliable information flows on the use of SMTA-PGR in commercial plant variety 
innovations are built up from intellectual property rights databases or other innovation databases, it is 
likely that a large gap will persist between potential and realisable payment flows into the BSF. The 
magnitude of the gap is likely to be different for different product categories. It can be expected that 
adherence to payment obligations will be greater when more information on innovations is available in 
the public domain. Information on intellectual property rights-protected innovations is generally 
available from patent and PVP databases. Intellectual property rights applications may also generally 
call for disclosure of parental material used in the breeding of plant variety innovations. The gap 
between potential and realisable payment flows into the BSF for different product categories/payment 
options can be captured in a “performance factor” parameter which is the proportion of the potential 
payment flows which can be expected to be realised. We have assumed the following “performance 
factor” values for different product categories/payment options.  
Performance factor for payments for patented varieties under Article 6.7     = 80% 
Performance factor for payments for PVP varieties under Article 6.7                 = 50% 
Performance factor for payments for regulated varieties under Article 6.7         = 20% 
Performance factor for payments for PVP varieties under Article 6.8                   = 10% 
Performance factor for payments for non-protected varieties under Article 6.8   = 5% 
Performance factor for Article 6.11 payments                  = 10% 
 The high compliance factor assumed for payments for patented varieties under Article 6.7 of the SMTA 
reflects the fact that these innovations will be relatively few and will be easily identifiable from patent 
databases that also provide information on the provenance and genealogy of these varieties. Varieties 
protected by PVP can also be readily identified from PVP databases, but much less information is 
available from these databases on the breeding history or genealogy of the protected varieties. Much 
less information is likely to be available on the provenance/genealogy of regulated varieties not subject 
to any form of IPRs. We also assume that the performance factor for voluntary payments under Article 
6.8 will be considerably lower than that for mandatory payments under Article 6.7.  The very low 
compliance factor assumed for Article 6.11 payments reflects the fact that these payment obligations 
may arise from a complex maze of transactions where SMTA-PGR is transferred from one Recipient to 
another (and hence may be difficult to monitor and track) and the difficulties in obtaining reliable crop 
level seed sales data of SMTA-users bound by Article 6.11 payment obligations. 
The realisable flows of payments into the BSF under different scenarios with the above performance 
factors are summarised in Table-15 below. The large gap between potential and realisable payments 
highlights the need to address issues influencing the performance factor. The application of innovative 
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approaches for enhancing payment flows into the BSF must not only enhance the potential for revenue 
generation but also examine systemic changes required to realise that potential.  
 
 
Table-15: Potential and Realisable Payment Flows into the BSF under All Scenarios (US $ million) 
ARTICLE 6.7 AND 6.8 PAYMENTS 
  
Option 1- Payment rates - 
Patented Products (0.77%), PVP 
Products (0.77%), Non-Protected 
(0.77%) 
Patented varieties 
(mandatory payments) 
PVP varieties (voluntary 
payments) 
Non-protected varieties 
(voluntary payments) 
Potential  Realisable Potential  Realisable Potential  Realisable 
6.07 4.85 10.67 1.07 42.44 2.12 
Option 2-Scenario 1-Extension of 
mandatory payments to PVP 
products 
Patented varieties 
(mandatory payments) 
PVP varieties (mandatory 
payments) 
Non-protected varieties 
(voluntary payments) 
Potential  Realisable Potential  Realisable 
As in Scenario 1 
Case 1-Patented Products 
(0.77%), PVP Products (0.77%), 6.07 4.85 10.67 1.07 
Case 2-Patented Products (1.1%), 
PVP Products (0.5%), 8.67 6.93 6.93 3.47 
Case 3-Patented Products (1.1%), 
PVP Products (0.2%), 8.67 6.93 2.77 1.39 
  
Option 2-Scenario 2-Extension of 
mandatory payments to PVP and 
Regulated products 
Patented varieties 
(mandatory payments) 
PVP varieties (mandatory 
payments) 
Regulated varieties 
(mandatory payments) 
Potential  Realisable Potential  Realisable Potential  Realisable 
Case 1-Patented Products 
(0.77%), PVP Products (0.77%), 
Regulated Products (0.77%) 6.07 4.85 10.67 1.07 42.44 2.12 
Case 2-Patented Products (1.1%), 
PVP Products (0.5%), Regulated 
Products (0.2%) 8.67 6.93 6.93 3.47 11.02 2.20 
ARTICLE 6.11 PAYMENTS  
  
Option 3 -   
Payment on all 
commercial seed of 
SMTA-PGR crop 
Payment on all patented 
and PVP varieties of 
SMTA-PGR crop 
Payment on all patented, 
PVP and regulated 
varieties of SMTA-PGR 
crop 
Potential  Realisable Potential  Realisable Potential  Realisable 
Scenario A  211.42 21.14         
Payment rates from Scenario B 
(1) -Patented Products (0.5%), 
PVP Products(0.23%)      85.23 8.52     
Payment rates from Scenario B 
(2) -Patented Products (0.5%), 
PVP Products(0.09%)      68.06 6.81     
Payment rates from Scenario C -
Patented Products (0.5%), PVP 
Products(0.23%), Regulated 
Products (0.09%)     
  
   101.93 10.19 
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Conclusions from Static Analysis 
PGR from the MLS supports a large base of plant variety innovations over a range of crops. Our analysis 
shows that the architecture of the SMTA restricts benefit-sharing payments to a narrowly defined sub-
set of the innovations facilitated by the use of MLS-PGR. The exclusion of a significant proportion of 
innovations from the purview of benefit-sharing arrangements arises, first from the restricted coverage 
of crops in Annex-I of the Treaty. Annex-I currently excludes several crops that play an important role in 
global agriculture and farm-based livelihoods. In particular, it excludes certain crops like soybean and 
cotton that have witnessed accelerated innovation through the application of biotechnology. The 
widespread adoption of these innovations and the rapid growth of the commercial seed market values 
for these crops have not translated into potential for enhanced payment flows into the BSF. Similarly, 
the exclusion of some important vegetable crops like tomatoes and onions has meant that some of the 
most dynamic and profitable segments of the seed industry remain outside the purview of benefit-
sharing arrangements envisaged in the Treaty. The extension of crop coverage in Annex-I to all crops 
would significantly enhance the potential for payments into the BSF. There may be a case for inclusion 
of crops in Annex-I based on their wider role in rural and farm livelihoods than on their relevance to 
food security alone.  
Even for crops that are currently included in Annex-I, benefit-sharing payments are restricted to a 
relatively small proportion of innovations facilitated by the use of SMTA-PGR. This is the result of the 
delineation of product categories that attract mandatory payments into the BSF. Restricting mandatory 
payment obligations to plant variety innovations protected by patents alone, effectively excludes the 
dominant portion of innovations developed using SMTA-PGR in both developed and developing 
countries. Most plant variety innovations in developed countries are protected by PVP rather than by 
patents. Although PVP-protected varieties generally remain available for further research and breeding 
to others, PVP does allow the appropriation of economic returns by innovators, a portion of which could 
devolve to the BSF. Bringing PVP-protected varieties within the purview of mandatory payments would 
significantly enlarge the innovation base that supports the BSF. Developing country NARS and CGIAR 
centres that breed for developing country environments are the most intensive users of SMTA-PGR. The 
innovations that they generate constitute the dominant proportion of innovations derived from SMTA-
PGR and probably have larger productivity and welfare effects than innovations in developed countries. 
Even if these innovations are not subjected to intellectual property rights, their commercial exploitation 
is facilitated by regulatory structures related to variety release, quality control and marketing. If the 
fundamental principle underlying the SMTAs is that benefit-sharing arrangements should be triggered 
by commercial exploitation of innovations incorporating SMTA-PGR, then these innovations should also 
contribute to the benefit-sharing payment flows. In developing countries where intellectual property 
rights systems for plant variety innovations either do not exist or are in the early stages of 
establishment, intellectual property rights protection of an innovation may not be a reliable or useful 
guide to its commercial potential. 
It should be noted that Article 6.8 of the SMTA already strongly encourages SMTA-users to make 
payments into the BSF for PVP-protected and non-protected varieties developed using SMTA-PGR. 
However, it is left to the discretion of SMTA-users whether to effect any voluntary payments. The 
experience of the International Treaty thus far suggests that exhortations for voluntary payments are 
unlikely to generate any significant payment flows into the BSF. Conversion of voluntary payment 
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obligations into mandatory ones may be an important step in providing a reliable and stable base for 
generating payment flows into the BSF.  
Enhancement of payment flows into the BSF will also call for a radical restructuring of the payment 
rates under Article 6.7 and Article 6.11. With the current structure of payment rates, the economic 
incentives for SMTA-users are highly skewed towards the selection of the Article 6.7 option. Although 
adoption of the Article 6.11 option by SMTA-users has the potential to generate larger revenue flows 
more quickly, no SMTA-user will have the incentive to do so at the current levels of SMTA-PGR use in 
plant variety innovations. Enhancing payment flows into the BSF through a large increase in the 
payment rate under Article 6.7 would not be feasible as such increases would be unacceptable to SMTA-
users and would adversely impact the uptake of PGR from the MLS. Incentivising the adoption of Article 
6.11 by a larger proportion of SMTA-users may, therefore, be a key approach to enhancing payment 
flows into the BSF. This will, however, call for a sharp reduction in the payment obligations under Article 
6.11 through a combination of a sharp reduction in the payment rates and narrowing of product 
categories that attract Article 6.11 payments with the possible option of applying different rates to 
different product categories.  
The application of the innovative approaches suggested by the Working Group (involving restructuring 
of payment obligations and payment rates) can substantially enlarge the potential for payment flows 
into the BSF. However, the realisation of the enhanced potential will require a climate that supports 
meticulous adherence to contractual obligations by SMTA-PGR Recipients. Systematic and independent 
periodic assessments of the state of plant variety innovation in different crops can improve the 
effectiveness of SMTAs and sustain the benefit-sharing provisions of the International Treaty. 
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